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M ICROECONOM ICS
STOCHASTIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTALEXTERNALJTIES*
ByG000r C. RAUSSER ANt) RICIIARI)HOWITT
The nature' of externalith's implies that rh'have' no thsccrnahh' market signals. hence',in an operational setting, iambusrnternahizations'_'he'mes urnst explicitly recognize' thate'vternahirt' outputS are:11)1threei!v at ce'ssthl.? It) th' policr inakt'r and that an observation sste'fli must ire'emploi'c'cfT/i' precision of this
observation or nu'a.surenie'flt sistem along With conventionaltaX, standard, or ''pollution right'' in.strui?ie,i(
are control variables available' to public agencies. in this paper, bath firm andpublic agency behavior
are analyzed under tax i'itenuili:rat,on schemes, stochastic c'xte'rnalitrnie'asurt'nit'nt we! a le'i,'a! system
Which resolves conflicts. It is shown. under the conditionsspec:fied, that optimal public agency muons
iru abe' thc' deriratjon of tax controls, measurement controls tins! lilt'sequential t'ct anal iou of inaccmss thE
state variables by a linear Kulman Jilter. Thc' two sets of controlsare (inns! to he wparahh' and thin the
optimal conditions may he slated iner,ns of two problems, the first is cauzce'rpied iritlu the optimaltax controls and the second ii'iih the optimal monitoring controls.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the clamor for instant environmental solutions diminishes,the task of rationally
allocating the finite capacity of environment disposalresources will be increasingly
viewed in its correct perspective, namelyas an economic problem of resource
use over time. This problem is complicated by the absence of price signals, often
coupled with indeterminant property rights. 'rhese characteristicsclassify the
problem as one involving externalities, which inan environmental context are
invariably negative.
Much of the recent literature on externalities has investigatedthe properties
of policy instruments imposed through government regulation.These instruments
are presented as a means for altering the impact of external diseconomies. Unfor-
tunately, virtually all of this literature treats externality control inthe context of
zero transaction costs,t perfect information, abrupt and instantaneous policy
changes, and no uncontrollable exogeneous influences. Hence, it isnot surprising
that policy makers, faced with uncertain effects of externality controls, inaccuracies,
and substantial costs in measuring and monitoring systems, have madescant use
of conclusions drawn from these economic models.
The very nature of externalities implies that they hae no dircctldiscern-
able market signals in value or physicalterms.2In other words, externality
$ Giannini Foundation Research Paper No.357nd Journal Paper No. i-S 197 of the Iowa
Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station. Ames, Iowa. The authorsare grateful to
Gregory C. Chow and an anonymous referee for helpful comnienis and suggestions. Project 20(c
Notable exceptions to thit observation are Bauniol and Oates [1971]. Calcbresi LI968]. and Dales
[1968] who have considered problems of transaction costs and information asailability For Inc delr-
ministic case.
In fact, as Starrett [1974, P. 2] recently argued. ''.. one can think of externalities as ss nonsmisus
with nonexistence of markets, and detine an externality to occur whcneser the prixateeconomy does
nest base sufficient incentives to create a potential market. "The usual definition of an externality.
viz..a decision variable of one economic agent which enters into the production function br utiIit
function) of some other agent. is far too broad; it defines all commodities in a barter econoins as
externalities.
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tioll system must heeniploycd. Choices on the type and precision of the
observation and measurement system arealso control variables availableto
policymakers.
With respect to measurement costs, the usual assumption that it IS Possible
to determine at no costprecisely what firms release into the environmentis
untenable. Surely, while a firm may record its financial transactions and its normal
outputs. permitting regulation of financialvariables, it ha.s no iflcentjvc torecord
its waste discharges, e.g., pollution emissions. The measurement of these discharges
involves costs which are clearly uncertain from the standpoint of environmental
control agencies.
The above discussion implicitly assumes the need for public control of
environmental externalities. This requires some justification. As often recognized,
under the usual perfectly competitive assumptions and externalities, decentralized
actions by economic agents will not lead to a Pareto optimum. Of course, when
the number of agents are few, Coase [1960] has shown that direct negotiation
between alfected parties may result in an efficient solution. The Coase treatment
has been the basis for many expositions of two- or three-party models with fixed
joint production possibilities in which environmental externalities are specifielto
have the consumption characteristics of normal private goods. These specifica-
tions do much injustice to most environmental externality problems whichcorre-
spond more closely to collectively consumed publicbads.3As Kneese [1971]
has noted, most environmental externalities are collectively consumed within
some relevant delineation, such as an airshed or watershed. In these situations,
exclusion problems arise and property rights are difficultif not impossible, to
define.4Furthermore. given the external effect of an environmental bad has
public properties over a sufficient number of individuals, there obviously exists
an incentive for individuals to misrepresent their truepreferences.5Since game
theory informs us that this sufficient number is small, thereare few environ-
mental externalities that fail to satisfy the characteristics ofa (quasi) local public
good.
The theoretical considerations of collectively consumed externality policyin the absence of
explicit transaction costs has been hriefl' examined by Baumol 11972]. Buchananand Stubblebine
[1962]. Mobring and Boyd [1971], and in more detail by Whitconib[1972]. For the properlies
of a continuum on types of goods between the polar publicand private cases, see Kamien ci at.
[1973].
Property rights cannot generally be detined whenever exclusionis costly or impossibie that is.
wheneser what is available to one agent doesnot alter what is available to another. Exclusion is clean>
costly in case of air. water, or noise pollution and impossible.as Starrett [1974. p. 6] points out. "by
definition when we are dealing with commoditiessuch as national defense, open rangeland. or public
parks.' Exclusion in the theory of externalitieshas been explored by Davis and Whinston [1967].
Kamien ci ii!. [1973]. and Turvey [1963].among others.
To isolate the incentives for individualsto misrepresent their preferences for exteinal goods
which are collectively consumed, simplyderive the society's optimal conditions and the potential
gains from individual internalization bribes. Undera zero liability rule, rational parties affected by
the externality will not offeran internalization bribe but will remain as "free rider"on those who do
offer bribes. The inclusion of theinevitable transaction costs only exacerbates the problem. The
particular situation where an incentive forindividual internalization action exists is the rare case Of
full liability on the waste dischargefirms for damages and transactioncosts
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I IIn general, given numerousparties, private transactionscosts' willtpically be so large. relative to the socialcost of the enviroumenttlexteruaIjtthai i1Co tialton among all partiesis not a feasible means ot reachingan efficientoltitj(,fl Under the common situation withabsence of full liability,signilicant transaction costs, and in addition locally collectiveconsumption of externalitiesdccentrali,ed internalizationvill not take place. However,the public goodnature of environ- mental quality and associatedexclusion problemssuggests that potential gains exist from "governmentalinternalization" of the externaleffect. Governmental internalization involves theestablishment of a centralcontrolling agency since enforcement of liability rules byitself, say via a legalsystem, is not sufIlcient for
optimal internalization. Thisinternalization will, ofcourse, have transaction costs associated with it. Thesecosts include the oftenneglected measurementcosts previously mentio'ned, otherinformation costs, enforcementcosts, and adminis- trative costs. Under the criterion ofPareto efficiency there isno qualitative reason to expect the minimization of thesetransaction costs to be lessimportant than the gains emanating from theinternalization process.
On the basis of the abovearguments, this paper presumes that theestablish- ment of a centralized controlagency is desirable. Thisagency, whether of a local or national character, treats environmentalquality as a public good andattempts to determine and regulate its supply.A number of institutionalstructures for determining and regulating thissupply have been offered inthe literature (Rausser and Fishelson [1974]). Thispaper addresses a class of these internalizationpolicies, viz., Pigorivian taxes andtaxes advanced to achievepredetermined standards. The emphasis is on evaluatinginformation problems associatedwith this class of
internalization schemes. In particular,transaction costs emanating froma measure- ment system on the externalitystates along with controlimplementation and enforcement costs are analyzed.
The organization of thepaper is as follows. In Section 2, thesystem repre- senting firm behavior which thepublic agency attempts to influenceis specified and briefly interpreted. Section3 examines the componentsof public agency
control. A stochastic externalitycontrol framework is presented inSection 4. One of the special features of thisframework is that control variablesinfluence not
only the state dynamics but also thestochastic measurement system. Thatis, the stochastic externality statesare specified to be accessible only througha stochastic
measurement system, and costly controlsare explicitly recognized both for the
fundamental process and themeasurement system. The optimal performanceis derived by the separation ofcontrols into two problems; the firstis concerned
with the optimal behavioral controlsand the second with the optimalmeasure-
ment or monitoring controls. This separationbetween the behavioral and
measurement controls, under specified conditions, is shownto be optimal. In
Section 5, the results of the separablecontrol formulation are interpreted and
in Section 6 an empirical applicationof the method is briefly noted.
6The significanceoftransactioncostsin the contextofexternalitieswasfirst emphasized by Coase(1960]and has subsequently been analyzed by Catebresi[1968].and Demsetz[1964],among others.Ingeneral, transactions can be incorporated in a multiproductformulationbyspecifying it as an alternatise output whichisjointlyproducedalongwitha unit reductionofthe eternaIity. Obviously,
the theoretical optimal internalizationdiffersfrom the societal Preio optimal solution by theamount ofthe transaction costs.
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2.FIR\tBrttA\'IUR
Public control ol'enviiOflfl1Cfltexternalities involves an attempt to it1f1Unc
the behavior of firms,individuals, and householdswho emit wastes or byproducts
in their pursuitof other activities. Forthe sake of exposition, we shall deal only
with productionexternalities in thepaper.7 Firms which generate environmental
wastes as a resultof their production processeswill be referred to as emitter firms
Within a particular airshed orwatershed, these firms will be assumed to have
certain knowledge ofperfectly competitive outputprices, market input and
the production processesfor normal goods as well asexternality goods. Further-
more. we presumethat each emitter firmdesires to nlaximize expected profits
over sonic planninghorizon of specified length.While these assumptions simplify
the actual situation facingmost emitter firms, theydo allow the construction of a
model which providesmuch insight into the public control of environmental
externalities.
The underlying production processfor each firm is characterized as one
involving generalized jointproduction. The production function of the j-th firm
for L normal outputs maybe represented asF1(q1.x,, x) = 0, j 1, 1
while the production functionfor each of K externality outputs may be repre-
sented asFkJ( WkJ(,Xkjf. x)0, k = I K, where q denotes an L component
vector of saleable outputs.denotes a vector of ordinary inputs employed in
the production of saleable outputs;x7 denotes a vector of joint inputs which are
employed in the production ofsaleable outputs but also influence the level of
the externality produced
;8
.vdenotes a vector of ordinary inputs employed to
control the amount of the k-tb externality, e.g.,emission control devices; w
denotes the kth externality (e.g., sulfuremissions); and t denotes time, i.e., i =
I T. The production structure implies thatthe transformation function between
any saleable output and anexternality is a single point; given fixed amounts of all
inputs, the firm cannot vary the amounts of saleableand externality outputs.°
Given the usual convexity assumption on F(.) and F5(.) for allk and), the
cost function w31)can be derived whose properties over the relevant range
(Rausser and Zerbe [1974]) are
iC,(.) 2C(')
(2.1) >0,-- 0, <0.
((I. ((1 (tV Ijt Jr
The distinction between production and consumption cxtcrnalitiesis nicelydrawn in Katmen
r ul. [l973].
Forexample. fuel inputs employed to produce electricity output arc also partially responsible
for the byproduct smoke, an externality.
This specilication generalizes the usua! tixed proportion nodel of externalities. i.e..oncethe
level ofsakabte outputisset, the e\Iernality outputisautomatically determined no matter what the
rates ofinprit use. Itisalso a more appropriate specilication that the multiproduct formulationinolving
asingle relationship F(q,. = 0 where isaKcomponent vector andx,(X;,.xoJ
This Joint product model, round in most intermediate economic texts,isnot generally applicable to
the caseofexternalities. Such a formulation wouldimplythat, given amounts of all inputs. lucre
saleable output cart be produced by altering the amount of externality output.This isclearly incorrect;
the externality output can only be variedbychanging the joint inputs (e.g.. type of fuel used) or the




SEmploying this cost function, the J-th firm optimization problem priorto any
internalization scheme may be represeitcd as
7 2) niax -fl[pq, - C(q.
qj.wJ
wherefl=11(1 + r), rbeing a subjective positive discount rate,p, denotes an
L componentofsaleable output prices at timet,and w
The above problem is. of course, altered by various internalization schemes.
These schemes depend upon (I) the controls available to the publicagency, (2) the
measurement of waste or emissions, and (3) legal recourses allowed a firm which
finds its measured emission level objectionable. These factorsare examined in
the following subsections. When combined, they result inan internalization
function (2.7) composedofa stochastic tax bill, monitoring costs, and firm legal
expenditures. Introducing this function into (2.2), firm decision rules and behavioral
equations are derived. The latter equations state firm saleable outputs (2.12).
externality outputs (2.13), and legal inputs (2.14) in termsofoutput prices and a
vector of per unit tax rates.
2.1 Tax internalization Schemes
Two schemes, both leading to per unit taxes imposed upon the emitter firms,
will be examined. The first tax internalization system is Pigouvian [1932] in nature,
while the second approach is described by Baumol and Oates [1971]. Despite
variations, a Pigouvian tax is based on the marginal damages currently caused
by the environmental wastes emanating from the production process of each
emitter firm. The formal derivation of the basic Pigouvian tax follows directly
from the definition of the Pareto optimal transformation for an externality com-
modity. Since the marginal private product achieved by an emitter firm under
perfect competition does not equal the marginal social product of the commodity.
a corrective tax is imposed.'° In principle, this tax provides an incentive for
emitter firms to produce socially optimal output levels. Moreover, the unilateral
imposition of a Pigouvian tax on emitter firms by a central authority is believed
to have lower transaction costs, and therefore greater potential internalization
than private individual negotiations among firms effected by the externality
(receptor firms) and emitter firms.'1
The second tax internalization approach focuses on one of the principal
limitations of the Pigouvian approach, viz., the marginal damage functions
'For a survey of the criticisms and an attempt to reconstrw:t the Pigouvian approach. see
Baumol [1972] or Whitcomb [1972]
Where transactions between receptors and emitters are possible. even though the unilateral
l'igouvian tax leads to a Pareto optimum, there may he incentives for the receptor and emitter firms
to bargain away from this optimum. Schemes to prevent Pareto suboptimal transactions include
bilateral taxes (Rausser and Zerbe [19741) and compensation paid by the emitter to the receptor firms
(Whitcomb 11972]). However,as assumed in Section I. if transaction costs of decentralized individual
action are sufficiently large to justify formation of a cental authority, the incentive for 'second round"
bargaining between receptors and emitters is insignificant and thus can be neglected, Under these
circumstances, a unilateral Pigouvian tax adjusted for transaction costs can be implemented to approxi-
mate Pareto efficient conditions. The degree of approximation is. of course, a direct function of the
transaction costs.
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associated with the variousreceptors or victims of the externality. These functions
in some situations aredifficult, if not impossible to determine and in most situations
contain substantialuncertainty. Faced with such limited information, Baumol
[1972] has argued thatpublic agencies should act on the basis of a set of minimum
standards of acceptability.These standards are presumed operational since poIiC\'
makers quite naturally thinkin terms of minimum acceptability standards. Hence,
unlike the Pigouvianapproach, this formulation assumes that an aggregate
physical standard of acceptablewaste levels is forthcoming from an informed
political process. Given thisstandard, the public agency seeks to determine a
fixed per unit charge (tax) Onenvironmental wastes capable of achieving the
predetermined standard.
An obvious advantage ofthis approach is simply that it requires little public
agency information onreceptors for its implementation. To be sure, it does not
dispose of difficulties involved incapturing a trueoptimum.'2Only if the pre-
determined standards happen by chance toequal the Pareto optimum levels will
this approach lead to the same setof taxes as the Pigouvian approach. In any
event, if the taxes are equal tothe aggregate shadow prices of environmental wastes
at the standard levels, theprespecified standards will be achieved by all firms who
employ their available resourcesrationally.'3A significant result of this approach
is that predetermined standards, at least inprinciple, will be achieved at minimum
cost to society.
2.2. Externality Measurement
A major difficulty confronted in attempting to apply either of the above
schemes is that they both assume externality outputs are directly accessible to
the public control agency. In an operational context, as noted in our introductory
comments, this assumption is untenable. That is, these internalization policies
should not be stated in terms of w3,, an inaccessible vector of externality outputs
from the policy maker standpoint, but instead in terms of say w7, a stochastic
measurement vector of the externality outputs w3,. Once this distinction is recog-
nized, the j-th firm's optimization problem after internalization becomes
T
(2.3) max V70 =E{1i1p31q, - Cq1,, wi,) -t,(wT....)1}
t=0
i.e., maximize the expected present discounted value of net profits after inter-
nalization, where E denotes the expected value operator (conditional on informa-
tion available at =
From the standpoint of the firm, w, is deterministic while its monitored or
measured value w is stochastic. The relationship between these variables will be
represented as
(2.4) w'j = H(n, gjw, ±
'2As Haumol [1972, p. 320] poims out is sweeps all of these difficulties under the rug.
'
Note that there is no need to assume that the firms are perfect competitors or that they maximize
any particular taiget variable. In fact, all this approach requires is that firms produce whatever output
they select at minimum cost.
14 Note thatwe implicitly assume each firm's utility is a linear function of profits and thus that each
firm is risk neutral. As before, ihis assumption is advancedto simplify the exposition while maintaining
an empirically useful formulation.
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ponent stochastic vector, composed of Continuous random variables, withmean
vector zero and a stationary, scalar covariance matrix. Furthermore, eachcom-
ponent of v1, is assumed to be distributed independently over time. The matrix
() is conditioned upon nil, the number of observations made by the public
control agency during period t, andg1, the requirements set by the control agency
for certification of the firm's control device effectiveness, The former variablemight
be expanded to include the frequency, accuracy, and form of inspectionand
monitoring actions by the control agency. Theg, variable might be interpreted
as the "set up" components of the monitoring system or simply the factors
associated with compliance testing and certification.
The matrix H() will be specified as the sum of twocomponents, an identity
matrix, and a "small sample bias" matrix. That is,
(2.5) gj = I + RW(nJlIgJf)
where ii(nIg,)= 0. In other words, the monitoring system for a given
g11 is assumed to be based on a sampling procedure which is asymptotically un-
biased. What this all implies is that while the first two terms,p,q11 and C(),
appearing on the right-hand side of(2.3) are deterministic, the thirdor internalia-
tion term is stochastic. Hence, the expectation operator need onlyapply to
2.3. Firm Legal Recourse
To provide a realistic specification on the additive tax internalizationcom-
ponent t1(-). the monitoring and taxing authority of the public control agency
will be separated from a court or settlement system which resolves conflicts
between the public agency and emitter firms. In particular, emitter firms may
object to public agency measurements and seek the assistance of the court system
to reduce these levels.'Such conflicts between firms and the public agency may
be resolved by settlement with or without court trial; the threat of a court trial,
of course, provides the basic incentive for an out of court settlement. To simplify
the following exposition, no distinction will be made between court litigation and
out of court settlements.'6
The perceptions of the j-th firm with respect to court resolution of conflicts
on w, will be specified as
(2.6) w = w'j + l41'(l,, l,
where w, denotes the court determined level of wastes, 'jl denotes the legal efforts
incurred by the firm to defend itself against the control agency, I,,, denotes the legal
prosecution efforts of the public agency, and w7 and nfl are as previously defined.
Furthermore, the stochastic internalization function for the tax schemes and a
court system to resolve conflicts may be stated as
(2.7) 1i.)UJrWI + Crnj4gjt, w1) + C17.(l1)
This structure is one of a number of possible institutional structures that might be considered.
Other structures include firm reporting of externality wastes and public agency determination of the
accuracy of these declarations by their monitoring measurements; public agency measurements and
no court or settlement system; and firm reporting but no public agency measurements (Rausser [I 975j(.
16For a treatment of this distinction. see Gould [1973] and Posner [l972.9731.
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where Ufi is a K component lOWvector ol constant rUnit taxes at time t
represents the tnonitonngset up' and reporting costs imposed upthe Iiru
) is the cost oflegal services: and !,, is the amount ollegal seivices put chased
by Ekej-th firm. The tax vector. u1i' set 1w the public control in eu
Pigouvian or Bauniol Oatesfashion.
Employing (2.4t and (2.6), theexpected ' al UC Ot I lit. tutu inkrual Itatit)fl L'O'iI
i2.7) is
(28) !t1()= )W11 + u) + ('(') +
The four terms of the expectedinternalized costs (2.8) may be given specific
interpretations. ['or the J-thtirni. the first term is the total expected tax bill,
given the firm accepts the measuredemissions of the public control agency. ii it
does not accept these measurements,this total expected tax bill is reduced hthe
second term, the tax savings resultingfrom a court trial or settlement. l-, The term
Cm,() is total monitoring andreporting costs borne by the tirm, and C11)) is Its
total legal expenditure.
2.4 Firm Decision Rules und Beluwioral Equalions
Substituting (2.8) into (2.3) and assuming the usual ditThrentiahle and con-
tinuity properties of the functions C(.). W'(.). C( ), and C,( ). the first-order
conditions for a fIrm optimum may be represented as
(2.9) U





= 0. (2.11) l4-
The first condition (2.9) is the usual firm decision rule for saleable outputs. viz..
equate the price of output to associated marginal cost for e'ch saleable output.
In the cse of externality outputs, condition (2.10) dcx iates from that found in
the economic literature on environmental externalities. More specifically, instead
of equating firm marginal control costs C( )/itt'11) to the per unit tax rate.
condition (2,10) suggests that the rational firm in the context of (2.3) wIll equate
its expected per unit tax rate (u31H(. ))to its marginal control costs plus the marginal
enforcement costs borne by the firm (-- );wft) arid resulting from societys
attempt to control environmental wastes. Finally, condition (2.11) suggests that
the firm will purchase legal inputs up to the point where the expected marginal
revenue product is equal to the price of legal inputs (p,1=
Note that. in generalIV U'( . 0. and 1V110. I,, n) = 0
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(2.14) 'ii = L1(p1. u)
where it is assumed that each firm takesn.j, gd,, icit and all its input pricesas given.
3. COMPONENTS OF TIlE PUBLICCONTROL AGENCY
The immediate concern of thepublic agency is to influence thebehavior of
wp by its setting of taxes, u. These actions, forthe framework advanced in Section2. also influence the behavior ofand l. The criteria by which thepublic agency
makes these decisions must be based,in part, upon firm emission devices,monitor- ing, and legal costs along with thepublic agency monitoring, controlimplementa- tion, and legal costs. In addition, thesocial costs of reductions in saleableoutputs
as well as the social benefits of reductions in damagesresulting from public agency
decisions should be taken intoaccount.
For most empirical situations,damages emanating from environmental
externalities occur at receptor locationswhich differ from the emitter locations.
Hence, externality concentrationstates at the receptor locations, theirmeasure-
ments, and the dispersion relationships betweenthese states and the emission
outputs (wi,) are required. This component alongwith transaction costs composed
of information, monitoring, and enforcementand the public agency criterion
function are the topics of this section.'8
3.1. In/brination and Monitoring
Externality policy, in a stochasticcontext, requires two principal types of
information, vii, initial estimation andmonitoring. The former is composed of
information on initial levels of the state variables,their transformation functions
over time, and the measurement system equations. The latterequations extend
over the control horizon and provide a basis for estimatingthe state variables
which are inaccessible to the public controlagency.
Monitoring of externalities canassume many forms and take place in many
locations (Rausser and Fishelson [1974]). Inour treatment, monitoring will be per-
formed to identify the emissionmeasurement stations (point sources or represent-
ative locations), estimate the levels of theexternality outputs and the concentration
of environmental wastes at variousreceptor locations. The principal monitoring
methods available include estimating the externalitystates by process definition
or equipment specification; by neriodic sampling at randomtimes; and by con-
tinuous monitoring.The first method is the least expensive and also the least
"For a more detailed analysis of thesecomponents in the context of a particular environmental
externality, see Rausser and Fishelson [1974].
Strictly speaking, without a dispersion specification for eachemitter firm, only the second and
third methods are possible for monitoringat receptor locations.
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I:precise. The last approach is the most preciseand expensive surveillance method.
Unfortunately, available technology is notsufficiently advanced toprovide
accurate measurements by useof this method. Thus, we shall only be concerned
here with the statistical sampling methodofmonitoring. This methodmay
include self declarations of emissions by individual firms with monitoring em-
ployed to determine the accuracy of the declarations.
The useofstatistical monitoring to measure environmental externalities
differs from the usual measurement system described in the control theory
literature (Aoki and Li [1969] and Kushner [1969]). As typically specified, a single
measurement unit is employed which is either "on" or "off" during a particular
time period. In this situation, the variance of the measurement observation is
either finite or infinite. The environmental monitoring system for a given region,
however, invariably consistsofseveral measurement points that can be operated
separately or simultaneously during a time period. All sources may be measured
randomly with the same frequency (uniform sampling) or in a responsive or
sequential fashion where the frequency of measurements is conditioned upon
measured emissions. The framework advanced in Section 4 will admit the latter
type of monitoring but will not explicitly treat the spacing or scheduling problem.
The monitoring system at the emission sites is reflected in the specification of
firm behavior by the variable w7 and at the receptor sites by y. As in the case of
(2.3), monitored receptor concentrations of environmental externalities will be
represented by
(3.1) = H(n, g31)y5, + VM
where the K x K known matrix H,.(.) is specified as
(3.2) H(n,,g) = I +
lim, y(sr I g) = 0; s = 1,. . . , S denotes the receptor site at which monitoring
takes place; ndenotes the number of observations at site s during period t;
g,, denotes the initial "set up" factors associated with system at site s; and v5, is
a K component stochastic vector, composed of continuous random variables,
with mean vector zero and a stationary, scalar covariance matrix. Eachcom-
ponent of vis assumed to be distributed independently over time but notneces-
sarily independently of contemporaneous components inmeasurement errors at
the emission sites, (Vj,). In our treatment, the initial "set up"components, g1, and
g,, will be taken as given and thus the precision of the state variable estimates,
w and y, obtained by monitoring will be stated in terms of n1 wheren = [nrn, P1y],
n',. = [n1...nh], and n = [n11...na,]. Hence, public agency variable costs
associated with monitoring, including administration, during periodt will be
represented as C(n1).
3.2, Enforcement
Monitoring measurements at both emitterand receptor locations represent
an enforcement activity. If firms do not report emissionoutputs, measurements
must be performed by the publicagency before tax controls can be applied.
Moreover, if firms object to publicagency measurements, legal settlements or
280court determination of emission outputs will be required. In this instance, legal
costs will be incurred by the public agency. These costs during period i will be
represented as C,(1,) where ! = .. l]. In the determination of I, J = 1.
J, the public agency is constrained by court behavior; in particular, court
determination of wi,. Although the public agency perception of this court (or
settlement) determined component may differ from the firm, it will be assumed
equivalent to (2.6).
3.3. Dispersion and Damages
To implement the Pigouvian tax scheme, we require both global damage and
dispersion relationships. For the BaumolOates tax scheme, 'localized damage"
and dispersion measures are needed. For this scheme, since taxes are employed
to achieve predetermined targets or standards, only localized measures of damages
incurred by deviating from standards are required. The dispersion relationships
for both schemes are necessary since damages occur at receptor locations which
differ from emission sites. Moreover, externality states at the receptor locations
are usually stated in terms of concentrations (e.g., parts per million) while externality
states at the emission sites are expressed on a weight per unit time basis.
In most empirical situations, estimation of individual receptor dispersion
and damage functions required for a Pareto optimum are simply impractical.
Assuming a few relevant receptor locations can be identified,2° the required
dispersion functions summarize relationships between average concentration at
each of these locations (which are S in number) and externality output rates at
each of the J emission sources. These relationships depend upon climatic condi-
tions, geography, and chemical reactions. As noted in Tietenberg [1974], they
involve four main phases--transport, dilution, depletion, and reaction. These
phases will be subsumed in the following specification
(3.3) Yt4.1 =y,+f(w,y,,e1)
where y = [.v11. ..ye,] denotes a vector of externality concentrations at repre-
sentative receptor locations during period t ; f(.) denotes the steady state dispersion
function, (f:/3w, > 0, ôf,/t3y <0, and aJ/ae10); w = [w11. .. wi,]; and e de-
notes a vector of uncontrollable exogenous factors, e.g., weather conditions.
Although this specification simplifies the actual process, it is nevertheless more
complex than those which have been previously employed (Tietenberg [1974]).
3.4. Criterion Function
To evaluate alternative controls, a criterion function for the tax internalization
schemes must he specified. On efficiency grounds, this function should reflect the
damages resulting from environmental externalities and the costs of controlling
these externalities. In Section 4, damages will be quadratic in the externality
concentration states; the control device, monitoring, and enforcement costs borne
by the firm will be quadratic in the externality output states: social costs of reduc-
tions in saleable outputs will be quadratic in the normal output states; public
20Factors affecting the selection of receptor locations include (i) the degree of physical homo-
geneity of the externality airshed, watershed, or region. (ii) the effects of exogenous influences such as
weather, and (iii) the degree of homogeneity over receptor preferences.
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agency adniinistrative costswill be quadratic in the behavioral controls; public
agency legal enforcement will belinear and separable across behavioral and
nicasurement controls; and public agency measurement costs will he an additive
nonlinear function olmeacurement controls. The criterion functionwilliflcflrpotate
all six of these components, and the objective is to minimize its expected value
over the public agency planninghorizon.
The quadratic form of the criterion function is both analytically tractable
arid adaptable to alternative internalization schemes. Moreover, it is well suited
for externality policy problems. The symmetric property of this form reflects the
social losses from either insufficient or excessive internalization which arc, for
many operational problems, equally costly to society. It also allows possible risk
aversion, a property commonly observed in public agency behavior.
4. STOCHASTIC CONTROL 01 LXTERNAI.ITIES
The problem of public control of externalities emitted by decentralized firms
is expressed here as a discrete linear quadratic Gaussian control problem. To
obtain a tractable solution which can be easily applied, we assume that the firms
take the public agency measurement controls as given while public agency takes
firm legal efforts as given. Under these assumptions, the controls are those that
act on the behavioral system of the decentralized firms and those that affect the
outcome of the monitoring system. The behavioral controls are u, while the latter
controls are n, and 'a' Using the notion of sufficient statistics and Bellman's
[1961] principle of optimality, the model is shown to be separable into three
distinct phases: the derivation of the optimal deterministic behavioral controls:
derivation of the optimal monitoring controls: and the sequential estimation of
inaccessible state variables by a linear Kaiman filter.2
1
4.1. SpecJicatio,i of Policy Problem
The cost of the state variables in time t will be representedas 2a; + zA1z,
where deleting the t subscript for the sake of convenience
W -4wwAwq0
(4.1) z =q, A Aq Aqq0 ,a =I/2p
[Y 0 0
In terms of the firm behavior, and a denote the current additive coefficient
effect of changes in w1 while and A.q denote the current interaction coefficient
effect of changes in w andq, on firm control and monitoring costs: Aqq denotes
the current additive coefficient effectof changes in q1 and Aq,. denotes the current
interaction coefficient effect ofw, on firm saleable output costs; and p denotes
the saleable output price vector. Thesubmatrix Ar>. of A and a;. denote the current
coefficient effect ol changes iny,, the SK component vector of externality concen-
trations.




l'he implementation and administrative costs of the behavioral controls to
the agency will be represented as 2bu, + uB,i1. the monitoring costs as C"(n,),
and the agency legal costs as C1(11). Given these definitions, the public criterion
function for a planning horizon of length T may be expressed as
(4.2) V = [2az1 + 2bu1 + r2r +uBu1 + C1'(n,)
+ C(11)} + 2az- + 2TATZT}.
The matrices and vectors a1, b,, A1, and B1 are expressed in present value terms,
i.e., the coefficients incorporate the public discount rate.
The constraints for the externality state variables are derived from the firm
behavior equations (2.12), (2.13), and the dispersion relationships (3.3). If the firm
functions C(.), W), Cmi(), and C1(.) are quadratic or if they can be reasonably
approximated by no more than a second-order Taylor series expansion, the firm
behavioral equations will be linear. Furthermore, if emitter firms form expectations
on output prices, externality taxes, etc., adaptively, the firm behavioral system
can be represented as a set of first-order difference equations. Additive stochastic
disturbances should also be incorporated to reflect unpredictable variations in
firm activities (2.12) and (2.13) from the public agency standpoint. When these
equations are combined with (3.3), we have a block recursive system in the current
state variable vector z,. Assuming f(.) in (3.3) is linear, this system can be cast
into its reduced form which will be represented as
(4.3) = 4z, + çl,,u, +, i0,... , T
Depending upon the actual empirical situation. (4.3) may be a simple first order
or a "compactfirst order, i.e., y, may include current and lagged values of itself
as well as current and possibly lagged control variables. Note thatincorporates
both uncontrollable exogenous variables and their effects on z, and the stochastic
disturbances entering the various equations.
The monitoring system on the inaccessible state variables may be stated as








H1(n1/g1) 0 0 Lw1
= 0 1 0 ,V = Vq1
0 0H,(n1/g.,) vyt
In other words, the only inaccessible states of importance are thoseassociated
with firm emissions (w1) and receptor concentrations ofexternalities (ye). Note
that although y" refers to the effective measures of theexternality states at the
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receptor locations,w"represented by (2.4) is not an effective measurement vector
Instead, the effective measurement vector of the externality states at the emission
sources isw,the court determined levels of w1. These determined levels depend
upon the public agency measurements atfirm sites (w): more specifically the
subvectorwolzis simply a condensed version of(2.4) and (2.6) for all emission
sources.
The stochastic components of the above model have the Gaussian distribu-
tions:
p(z0)=ô exp[z 0)'(Q0Y '(z0 -)]
(4.6) p(')= 2exp[Q, 'J
p(v1) = ()3exp [v,R,t(,,i)v,]
where O1,,, andare appropriate constants;Q,and R1 are the covariance
matrices of disturbance terms, and v,; Q0is the covariance of the initial period
state estimates: andis the initial state estimate. Note that monitoring precision
is reflected by R t(n'cr)
The behavioral and monitoring controls are constrained by their respective
admissibility sets:
(4.7) U, EU, U,E N.
For the behavioral controls, the set represents the limits of politically and legally
acceptable controls. The monitoring control set is constrained by physical feasi-
bility which is defined in terms of the monitoring "capital complex."
4.2. Separationof Controls
From (4.3) and (4.4), the state variables in any periodtare functions of agency
controls u,.,it,. !.,,and all previous values of controls and monitoring observa-
tionsZfl'.All of this information may be summarized by the informationstate E,
which is defined as
(4.8a) h(z,I Z", U,-, N, L,,0,
where Z"(z... z"), U,_=(u0...u,_ ), N, =(n1...n,), and L,=(I...
A recursive equation for the informationstate, i.e.,
(4.8b) , + = F(E,,z;'4,,.n1+,la.,.),t = 0.....T
may be found by application of Bayes' rule.22 UsingBellman's [1961] principle
o optirnality. the recursive relation for the criterionfunction can be stated in
terms ofas
(4.9)J,(E,) Mm(J'(E,,u,,n,,tct+) + E{J,+ 'r,I+ I' tci+, Z C,,.,,,
p
subject to (4.7) where the expectationE on the second component is taken with
respect to z.1. Since the behavioralequations and the measurement system are
specified as linear with Gaussianerror terms, the conditional update process of
22 Ourtreatment is similar to that found in Meier.L.,elat. [I%7J who examined physically
constrained measurements in thecontext of radar systems.
284the information state E, (4.8b) is most efficiently performed by the Kalmari filter.
It follows that the information state can be specified by the sufficient statistics
from the Kalman filter, viz., 2, the mean updated estimate of;, and the covariance
update matrix Pu,. Thus,,= (2k,,,Pm).
Employingand P,, in the first term of (4.9) after taking expectations and
neglecting the uncontrollable exogenous variables entering,, wehave
(4.10)l'(_,,ti + +) = 2a21+ 2bu + 2;1A211 + uB,u
em( r'Iii ' rbA - + ifl1 + I, + +,-r,
t=0.......-.1.
From standard results on the deterministic linear control model,23 the second
component of(4.9) may be expressed as
(4.11) Jl+1(E,+l)=2;+lk+lII2+l/1+I
± tr[P1P,11] ± J"1(P,111) +
where (.) is the value function for the measurement and agency legal system,
and the term +is independent of u, n,+,and 1+.The symbols P, and












* p, = a ++t + I - Pt + 1
*-- + b;)[,;P1fr, + B]P+14i,.
Calculating 2, +by using its sufficient statistics in terms of the available
estimate z1, yields
(4.14) E{2,+,+I2P1,} = + tJiu
where, for sake of simplicity,Efr)is assumed to be zero. Furthermore,
(4.15)E{[z',"1 -H+ + t'u)i{z - H1 +t/iuj]'}
=E{[v,++ H, 1(z+ - /2 -fi,uj]
[v1+ H,(z+ i --
=R,1 + +
That is, the prediction error covariance of is composed of the monitoring
system error covariance int+ 1 and the filter mean prediction error covariance,
For derivation and proof of the deterministic control model and its recursive cost matrices
I',and see Joseph and Tou [1961].
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which is itself a function of the covariance updateinIand the state transition
equation covariance in time I.
To manipulate (4.11) in terms of,we require the lollowing results from the
Kalman filter
the filter gain matrix
(4.16)r-i4H;,1[H,+1J. ± R1(fl11i,f)]:
the covariance prediction equation
(4.17) Pz+ Q+ bfPt/,.
the mean update equation
I .,1H (4.18)2,+IrI(bi:, + 1'i+ 1(+ IL-if 1 - 11,
and the covariance update equation
(4.19)P,+ti= 1t-H4.1P
(c6II±/i1u)]
Proceeding by employing (4.14), we have for the first term of(4.l I)
'+j-Ir-f , s
= -f F + II,1u)
+ tr {I+1K, 1(R, + H+ "--l!tHfl1)K1
Defining the last term of (4.20) as tr '\and using (4.16), we obtain
(4.21) trAr=trI 11,H;+1k;,
This expression can be restated by employing (4.19) and (4.12)as
(4.21a) tr A1=tr(P7+4- F - 1,)P,1-4- P.-
The second term of (4.11) can be expressed likewiseas:
(4.22) 2p12f+ =2p,+l(2U,+ I,l',14j.
Now by successive substitution of(4.21a) into (4.20);and (4.20), (4.22) into (4.11);
(4.11) and (4. 10) into (4.9); the v&ue of the criterionfunction in I can be expressed
in terms of the Kalman filter conditionestimate in t(2,,), i.e.,
(4.23)J1(s,)= mm{2a2,, + 2b;u, + + u;B,u, + C. (r+i)
i .1,,
+ C,+ +)-itr [P.,,A] + 2p. +
+ ((P,21, +fr,t,)'I +i(4i,,i, + 'I',",)
+ tr [(P'-i- P - A,)P11 + -
-F tr[i+1+111+1] + J1(+1111)+
l
I + I J-
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(4.20)Alter some sirnplihcatmns. this control Optimizationcan be separated into terms
involving either the behavioral coiitrols Or themonitorand legal Controls as
arguments,butnotbotharid thus can be separatclopttmited. That is.
(4.24)J,(V',) = + 2b;u, ± ,;B1,
+ Li [!-I,] +nunC'1(n1, )+ C )
i .13-
+ tr [P7.P,]+ i', + tr [P,.,] + 'h.
4.3.Behai1uralComrois
Front that part of the criterion function containing the behavioral controls, it
is clear that its form is the same as the familiar linear quadratic Gaussian (L.Q.G.)
contol model.The separation properties of the L.Q.G. model allow the optimal
controls to be derived separately from the derivation of the conditional estimate
2,. The optimal behavioral controls are
(4.25) = G1,.1± g,
where the control gain matrix b1 is defined as
(4.26a) G1 = (iP,. +Bj '(çliP 4)
(4.26b) g--(I-'P+', +B,Y '(;+4- b)
and P is given by (4.12), p1 by (4.13), and,, by (4.18). The significance of this result
is that the optimal behavioral controls u1 are expressed in terms of G,g1, ,
P7, p1. p7 which are independent of the matrices R1 and H1, and thus can be derived
independently of nand !
4.4. ?vfoniforingandLegal Controls
If the terms in (4.24) that are independent ofu,. ,and i,are specified
as additive over time, thenb,is defined
= tr[IO]+ b.. = 0.....T I
bT= tr[Pl+ltT].
The optimal measurement and legal controls may therefore be obtained from the




C(z1) + C,(l1) + tr [P7P]
subject to (4.19) and the admissibility constraints on it,. For this problem, the
Kalman covariance update function (P,) acts as the state constraint equations.
Due to the nonlinearity, there is no exact analytical derivation for the optimal
measurement controls. However, gradient procedures can be employed to solve
this problem.
For a survey of the linearquadratic Gaussianmodel, see Athans {1972].4.5. Combined Systems Control
Examination of the separated optimal monitoring and legal controlproblem
(4.28) shows that the optimal controls are obtainable apriori.The cost matrix
P7 isobtaineda priorifrom the solution of the deterministic linear control problem
1. ikewise. the covariance update matrix P,., is available. Thus,(4.28)can besolved
for the optimal n, and lfort =I.....T The solution dictates that themarginal
legal and monitoring cost in a time period be equated with the imputedvalue of a
"smaller" state covariance estimate to the public agency.
The overall solution procedure involves four principle steps. First, usingthe
prior estimates of 2 and Q0, derive the trajectory of G,, I. P7,p,, p7 matrices
Second, combining the results of step one with the prior knowledge of themonitor
error covarianceR(.),derive the trajectory of optimal measurementcontrols and
P,1,over the complete planning horizon. Third, observe the monitorrecords fo
time periodt,z", and using P,,, from step two, calculate with the Kalmanfilter
the conditional estimate of;, 2,,. Fourth, using 2,,, and the controlgain matrix
for the behavioral controls calculated in stepone, derive the optimal behavioral
controls u, for timetgiven z. Steps three and four are repeated for alltime periods
in the horizon and all observationsz".The resulting overall optimalcriterion
function for the problem may be stated as
(4.29) J=22p + 2Pc,±O + tr [P0Q0J
f'tr [P,, + P7 + C(n7) + C,(l)}
where n7 and lare the optimal measurement and legal controlsat time 1.
5.EcomiicINTERPRETATIONS
Each of the seven terms entering the optimalloss function (4.29) havea precise
economic interpretation. The firsttwo terms,JP020 and result from the
linear decision rule which obtains byminimizing the costs ofresource misallocation
due to the externality and thebehavioral controls as specified inthe criterion
function. Under the assumptionsimposed, this cost is equalto the "certainty
equivalent" cost. Clearly, therecursive specification of P0 andPo' i.e., (4.12) and (4.13), implies the optimalityof behavioral controls andexternality states over all time periods. In addition,the derivation of P0 demonstratesthat it is additive in four costcomponents These componentsare: the cost of externalities in the
current period; the cost of thepresent externality states in future timeperiods: the cost of changes inpresent behavioral controls interms of future externality levels: and the administrativecost of implementing the behavioralcontrols. Likewise, p0 is basedon the same four costcomponents in linear form.
The third term tr [P0Q0] isthe cost of uncertaintyassociated with the initial estimates of the statevariables. The experimentalinformation value of more precise estimates ofis shown not onlythrough Q0 but also via the Kalman filter covarjances,especially in the initialstages. Reductions in the filterco- variances, of course, alsolower the cost of thefifth term of (4.29). The fourthterm Ttr(pQ)
is the trajectory ofCosts from uncertain estimates ofthe state
288transition equations. Since the covariancealso affectsP,.via the covariance
prediction equation (4.17), returns to investment in passive information in the
reduction of Q, may be derived. Obviously, the investment in experimentation is
most valuable if performed before the control program commences. The fifth term.
tr [Pt. P,,j, is the cost of inaccurate filter estimates of the current state
variables. It is through this term that the benefits (reductions in the measurement
covariance R) of the measurement controls enter the criterion function. Note
that, unless the functional relations ofQand R inPare linear, a change in the
value of Q changes the information value from a given reduction in R. Reductions
in the measurement covariance R are achieved by both agency measurement
controls, ti, and 1. The cost reductions from agency increased monitoring precision
are equated to the returns from agency legal inputs. The latter inputs are employed
by the agency to minimize the costs of inaccurate adjustment of the monitored
emission levels by court action. Finally, the terms C"(n,) and are the operating
costs borne by the agency of the monitoring and court system.
The separable control results of Section 4.2 and the associated economic
interpretations25 can be extended in a number of directions. Under the assumed
structure of Section 4, the introduction of fixed public agency budgets which are
binding requires an iterative approach if the separability between the behavioral
and measurement control problems is to be maintained. This is simply because
binding agency budgets must be allocated to both behavioral control and measure-
ment control costs.
If the assumed institutional structure is modified to include firm reporting,
the separability between the behavioral and measurement control problems no
longer holds. For this institutional structure, a behavioral component depends
upon the measurement component and thus the optimal behavioral and measure-
ment controls must be determined simultaneously. A similar situation exists
when the public agency does not take firm legal efforts as given but instead recog-
nizes the behavioral equation (2.l4 Of course, if firms do not take the measure-
ment controls of the public agency as given, the separable result of Section 4
again breaks down. In general, if both the firms and public agency have reactions
functions on the activities or policies of the other, a game theoretic formulation
would be required, and an indeterminant solution would result.
As forcefully argued in a simpler context by Posner [1972] for most empirical
problems involving public agency control, it is reasonable to assume that reaction
functions exist only for the agency. That is, an asymmetry between the position
of the emitter firms and the public control agency is presumed. For this case,
emitter firms would take the policy rules on behavioral and measurement controls
as given, but the public agency would take explicit account of all its rules upon
the emitter firm's decision rules (2.12) through (2.14). Following Lucas [1974],
Kydland and Prescott [1973] have referred to this formulation as a hierarchical
structure in which the public agency is dominant. Due to space limitations, this
and other modifications and extensions noted above will not be treated here;
25The detailed propertaes of the behavior controls (4.26k the measurement controls (4.29). their
comparison to existing formulations of envixonrnental externality problems. and conditions under
which a stationary state obtains are presented in a technical appendix to this paper. This appendix is
available upon request.
289instead they will be topics examinedin aIitnrc paper on environmental externalj1
problems. -
6. ESIriRICAi. 11I'iEMiNI A I R)N
The model developed in this paperis being applied to the problem of agricul-
tural pesticide externalities. The useof pesticide inputs hthe agricultural sector
result in occupational injuryexternalities. These external effects necessitate some
minor changes in the model specificationadvaiiceo in this ptper. Although general.
it is conceptualized in the contextofair, land, or water pollution externalities.
Moreover, the empirical modelfor these externalities Pertains to the State of
California. In what follows, we briefly reviewthe empirical implementation of a
stochastic framework for the control oCelifornia pesticide externalities.
Given the physical and institutional settingof(lie problem, the internalization
of pesticide externalities cannot practicallybe affected by a Pigouvian tax scheme.
The transaction costs of identifying themarginal damage functions from point
emitter sources would be so great for all hut extremeworker symptoms that
Pigouvian solutions are unworkable. The currentnstitutions inCalifornia.
however, readily admit a Baumol-Oates tax internalizationscheme.
One departure of the empirical model from the theoretical model is to ignore
the legal dimensionofthe flim and agency decision functions. The reason is the
absence of data on legal inputs from the firms, and the very small use currently
madeoflegal inputs and sanctions by the local enforcement agencies in California.
If a policy of less bark and more bite in enforcement sanctions is adopted, the
costs of legal action will doubtless enter therm and agency decision process.
The firms using the pesticides and producing the occupational injury external-
ities are dominantly small family firms. As such, they will approximate the assump-
tions of perfectly competitive behavior and dominant agency actions of the
theoretical model specification. In addition, the institutions of standards and
uniform taxes to achieve those standards avoids the need for knowledge of the
individual firm's production functions.
The agency controlling pesticide use in California is responsible to State
Department of Agriculture. The standards governing use, and the tax rate on
pesticides is legislated in the Agricultural Code: but monitoring, inspection and
enforcement activities are decentralized to local County Agricultural Commis-
sioners. Under the agricultural code the County Commissioners must be informed
by a formal permit of the detaIls of each use of a restricted pesticide. The reports
aie monitored for violations of application or later field work standards. The
Commissioner inspects both the records of pesticide dealers to detect reporting
violations and the field operations during and after a proportionofthe applications.
The enforcement capabilities of the Commissioner extend from formal hearings
without sanctions to cancellation of operating permits which involves a pest
control operator or grower in substantial costs.26
2o The occupational Injuriesof the workers are theorencafly reported and paid for through the
State Workman's Compensation Fund. In practice many of the pesticide related injuriesgo unreported
and often uncompensated. due to the nature of the symptoms thatare debilitating rather than acute.
Moreover, many workers are often only on daily contracts, have language problems andare ignorant
of the Workman's Compensation system.
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The pri lid pa I co fli ponen t', of the stochasticcontrol framework are estimated
iii the !Ilowin1 manner.
th'Iiauioral!)Lsc,'.s;o,i and Iniurr Lqnations:Three state equal ions were
;ncjfjed which pertain to firm hehavioi, (2. 12).(2.13), acres ot land allocated to
agricultural production. saleable output and pesticideexternality levels In addi-
tion, dispersion relationships 13.3) are subsumed in thespecification of two other
state variable equations. viz, pest control worker and fieldworker injuries. These
dynamic relationships are estimated froma time scries of cross sections related
to incidence rates from public health records, a primary firm workersurvey, and
pesticide use data. In estimating the behavioralequations, the price elasticity of
demand for pesticides is based upon nationwide (lata.
ExiernalitMeasure;ne,it Lquations.' For this problemit was not possible
to estimate (2.4) on the basis of sample data. Hence, subjective estimatespertaining
to the precision of pesticide externality Irleasurementwere parameterized in the
model. Due to the low incidence of enforcementand high frequency of permit
monitoring by County Commissioners, the rational firmwould report all but the
most incriminating information.27 In the case of(J.l), sample basedestimates of
worker injury reporting accuracy is available. These estimatesare based upon
primary survey data collections and oflicial reports for thesame point in time and
area: knowledge of the Workman's Compensation System by the farm workers
in the primarysurvey; and casestudies byCalifornia Departmentof Public Health.
Criterion tunction: On the basis of the concern with industrial safety it is
deduced that certain levels of occupational injury are merit goods. Thus, that
portion of criterion function associated with externality damages is specifiedto
be a quadratic function of the deviation of pesticide related worker injuryrates
from aggregate industrial injury rates. The weighting coefficientsare the costs to
the individual of pesticide injury, estimates from public and primarysurvey data.
Firm control, monitoring and enforcement costs are aggregated and specified in
the criterion function as the cost (quadratic) of pest control industry safety equip.
ment and industry variable safety inputs. The remaining costs entering the criterion
function are as listed in Section 3.4 and are stated in terms of County Commissioner
control actions.
Behavioral and Measurement Controls: Using the estimates outlined above,
the stochastic controls of Section 4 are presently being derived using the separable
results, (4.25) and (4.28). From these control derivations, policy implications will
emerge with respect to pesticide externality taxes, measurement control priorities
and the value of passive experimental information on the empirical model's param-
eters. In this empirical setting, the implications of a common agency budget
constraint across both behavioral and measurement controls will also be analyzed.
To facilitate this analysis, the separability among controls will be maintained and
an iterative scheme will be employed to achieve consistency between the two sets
of controls and a predetermined public agency budget. This approach will allow
us to compare two administrative frameworks in which tax determination and
monitoring and enforcement are the responsibility of the same agency or two
segregated agencies. 1ova Slate University
UniversityofCaIfornia, Davis
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